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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
COX ROCK PRODUCTS, 
Plaintiff & 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 20136 
WALKER PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION, 
and BALBOA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants & 
Appellants. 
Respondent's Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Cox Rock Products, (Cox) 
against Walker Pipeline Construction, (Walker), and 
Balboa Insurance Company (Balboa), for payment of asphalt 
Cox supplied to Neeley Western (Neeley), sub-contractor, 
Walker as the general contractor and Balboa as issve-
of a payment bond. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court, the Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, sitting without a jury on the 25th day 
of April, 1984. The court found for the plaintiff-
respondent Cox and against defendants-appellants Walker 
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and Balboa and awarded judgment of $4,431.45, together 
with interest, and $1,200.00 attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent Cox seeks the decision of the 
lower court to be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In October, 1982, defendant-appellant Walker, 
general contractor contracted with Neeley, sub-contractor, 
to perform asphalt patching work for trenches dug 
in a waterline construction project for Ephraim City, 
the owner of the project. Neeley purchased asphalt 
from plaintiff-respondent Cox to be used in the trench 
patching job. The asphalt was purchased by Neeley and 
picked up by Neeley at plaintiff-respondent Coxes batch 
plant in CenterfieId, Utah, and transported by Neeley 
to Ephraim, Utah. Defendant-appellant Balboa issued a 
payment bond as required by Ephraim City, the owner. 
The laying of the asphalt by Neeley was never 
accepted by the owner Ephraim City, having been considered 
by Ephraim City as defective. Consequently, Neeley 
was never paid for the work and in turn did not pay 
plaintiff-respondent Cox. No defect was found with 
the asphalt itself only the placing of the asphalt 
in the trenches was defective. 
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Shortly thereafter Neeley filed a petition 
in bankruptcy and action was brought by plaintiff-
respondent Cox against the general contractor Walker 
and Balboa. 
Asphalt was purchased by Neeley for the job 
beginning October 6, 1982 and ending October 26, 1982. 
Sometime in November, 1982, plaintiff-respondent 
Cox through its secretary Larry Cox telephoned defendant-
appellants Walker and discussed the situation with Scott 
Walker, owner of defendant-appellant Walker. In the 
course of the conversation, plaintiff-respondent Cox 
advised Scott Walker of the amount owed for asphalt 
purchased by Neeley, and used on the Ephraim trench 
job. (T.R. p. 22) . 
During the month of December, 1982, plaintiff-
respondent Cox again telephoned defendant-appellant 
Walker, made demand for payment and advised Walker of 
the amount ovrod and was told by Walker that since the 
laying of the asphalt had been rejected by the owner 
Ephraim City, Walker could not pay. (T.R. p. 22). 
A third telephone conversation was had between 
Larry Cox with Scott Walker's wife, company owner of 
Walker in December, 1982, wherein demand for payment 
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was made and the amount owed indicated. (T.R. p. 23). 
On December 28, 1982, plaintiff-respondent 
Cox sent by regular mail written notice to defendant-
appellant Walker making demand for payment and forwarded 
a copy of invoices evidencing asphalt purchased by 
Neeley indicated the amount of each purchase on each of 
the invoices. Exhibit 4 (T.R. p. 24). 
Appellants Walker and Balboa in their answer to 
plaintiff-respondent's complaint admitted the existence 
of the payment bond put up by defendant-appellant 
Balboa. Appellants acknowledged in their answer that 
the Utah Procurement Code applied to the instant case 
and only contested that proper notice had not been given. 
Defendants-appellants Walker & Balboa never challenged 
the applicability of the Utah Procurement Code at 
trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The ruling of the lower court is fully 
supported by the evidence submitted at trial and when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff must 
be affirmed. 
2. The very heart and purpose of a payment bond 
is to protect and insure payment to sub-contractor or 
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supplier. Appellant did not contest the applicability 
of U.C.A. 63-56-1, et. al. at trial and is now barred 
from raising the issue on appeal. 
3. Appellant contractor had actual notice of 
the claim and its amount of respondent Cox. The notice 
was given within 90 days of the last material supplied. 
4. The amount of the claim is supported by 
invoices signed by Neeley or his agents and all of 
such material went to the Ephraim project. 
5. The lower court has the discretion to award 
attorney's fees. The legislature intent was not to 
bar recovery of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE MUST BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAINING THE LOWER 
COURT'S DECISION. 
In O.B. Oberhansley vs. Dell B. Earle, et. al., 
572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
We begin by noting that on appeal, the 
decision of the trial court is entitled 
to a presumption of validity. We are 
required to view the evidence and any 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to sustaining the decision. 
Id. at page 1386. 
The Utah State Supreme Court further states in 
Del Porto vs. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972): 
This court has both the prerogative and 
the duty to review and weigh the evidence 
and to determine the facts. However, in 
the practical application of that rule, it 
is well established in our decisional law 
that due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, in close proximity to the parties 
and the witnesses there is indulged a pre-
sumption of correctness of his findings and 
judgment, with the burden upon the appellant 
to show that they were in error, and where 
the evidence is in conflict we do not upset 
his findings merely because we may have 
reviewed the matter differently, but do 
so only if evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. 
Although there was some discrepancy in the testi-
mony of the witnesses, the trial court having had the 
benefit of trying the case, hearing and observing the 
witnesses and parties, made various findings of fact. 
The findings made by the trial court are all supported 
by the evidence at trial. 
Since the defendants-appellants Walker and Balboa 
seek reversal of the lower court's decision on appeal, 
they have the burden of proof to show the trial court 
was in error. B & R Supply Company vs. Bringhurst, 
28 U.2d 442, 502 P.2d 1216 (1972). 
All of the lower court's findings are supported 
by the evidence and accordingly defendants-appellants 
Walker and Balboa have failed to meet their burden of 
proof. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WALKER & BALBOA. 
The bid specifications advertised by Ephraim 
City the owner of the project required the contract 
to secure both a performance and a payment bond. Walker 
was the low bidder and awarded the contract and 
secured a performance and payment bond from Balboa. 
The Utah Procurement Code creates some ambiguity 
with regard to the act and its requirements applying 
to counties and municipalities. The Utah Procurement 
Code is set forth statutorially in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-56-1, et. al., 1953 (as amended); the code 
provides: 
Except as provided in Section 63-56-3, 
this chapter shall apply to every expenditure 
of public funds irrespective of their source, 
including federal assistance by any state 
agency under any contract. It shall also 
apply to the disposal of state supplies. 
63-56-2 (2) , (Emphasis Added) 
The obvious intent of the legislature could 
not have been to deny recovery to sub-contractors, 
materialmen, and suppliers of public contracts involving 
cities, towns and counties who have required performance 
and payment bonds. There would be no purpose for obtaining 
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a payment bond to insure payment to sub-contractors, 
materialmen and suppliers if action could not be brought 
against the bond. The very heart and purpose of the 
payment bond is to protect sub-contractors, suppliers 
and materialmen to insure payment for their service, 
suppliers, labor or materials, Most all public 
contracts, including the one in the instant case, 
are funded by grant or financial arrangements involving 
creditors. Creditors require as a condition of the 
financing or grant, that such bonds as payment bonds 
be required. To require a payment bond, have one 
provided, only to find that the payment bond is un-
reachable arrives at an inequitable and unreasonable 
result and accordingly denies the very purpose of a 
payment bond. 
Section 63-56-1 et. al., was not raised by 
pleadings or at trial by Walker and Balboa as a defense 
with regard to its applicability to the instant case. 
Walker and Balboa in fact admitted the applicability 
of the statute and only challenged Coxes failure to give 
proper notice within the 90 day period required by 
the above referred to statute. (Section 63-56-38) 
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Walker and Balboa admitted in paragraph 1 of 
their answer, that Balboa put up the payment bond 
as set forth in plaintiff's complaint. Walker and 
Balboa are barred from raising 63-56-1 et. al. on 
appeal since their pleadings admit the statutes 
applicability and the existence of the payment bond 
and are now barred on appeal from raising the same. 
In the event a determination is made that 
the Utah Procurement Code does not apply to the 
facts of this case, to bar recovery against Balboa 
on the payment bond would be to deny the very purpose 
for which the payment bond was required and exists, 
that being to insure that sub-contractors, material-
men and suppliers are paid for their services, labor, 
material, etc. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PROPER NOTICE 
WAS GIVEN IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The first asphalt supplied by Cox was delivered 
to the Ephraim project on the 6th day of October, 1982. 
The last asphalt supplied by Cox to the Ephraim project 
was delivered October 26, 1982. (See Exhibit 1 invoices). 
Because of Ephraim City's rejection of Neeley's 
laying or placing in the trenches of the asphalt, the 
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fact that he did not get paid for the same, and his 
petition in bankruptcy prompted Cox in November to make 
a telephone call to Walker, wherein Cox advised Walker 
of the situation, advised Walker of the amount of asp-
halt supplied by Cox, and the amount owed and made 
demand for payment. (T.R. p. 22) . 
Sometime prior to the 28th day of December, 1982, 
Cox had a second telephone conversation with Walker 
wherein demand was made and the dollar cimount specified 
to Walker for asphalt supplied to his project in 
Ephraim by Cox (T.R. p. 19). 
A third telephone conversation occured between 
Cox and Scott Walker's wife, co-owner of Walker in 
December of 1982. Demand was made for the amount owed 
for the asphalt and the amount was specified. (T.R. 
p. 23). 
On December 28th, 1982, by regular mail Cox 
sent a letter to Walker demanding payment together 
with all invoices for asphalt supplied by Cox with 
the purchase price specified on each invoice. 
This action was taken and this notice was given 
within the 90 day period required in Section 63-56-38 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended). 
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The Utah State Supreme Court had not had occasion 
yet to consider the notice issue here presented and 
therefor the court has never construed the notice 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38. 
However, there exists a federal statute, 40 U.S.C. 
Section 270B, referred to as the Miller Act, the state 
and federal statute are essentially exactly the same. 
40 U.S.C.A. Section 270B (a), provides as follows, 
to-wit: 
Every person who has furnished labor or 
material in the prosecution of the work 
provided for in such contract, in respect 
of which a payment bond is furnished under 
Section 270A of this title and who has not 
been paid in full therefor before the 
expiration of a period of ninety days after 
the day on which the last of the labor was 
done or performed by him or material was fur-
nished or supplied by him for which such 
claim is made, shall have the right to sue 
on such payment bond for the amount, or 
the balance thereof, unpaid at the time 
of institution of such suit and to prosecute 
said action to final execution and judgment 
for the sum or sums just due him: Provided 
however, [t]hat any person having direct 
contractual relationship express or implied 
with the contractor furnishing a payment bond 
shall have a right of action upon the said 
payment bond upon giving written notice to 
said contractor within ninety days from the 
date on which such person did or performed 
the last of the labor or furnished or supplied 
the last of the material for which such 
claim is made, stating with substantial 
accuracy the amount claimed and the name of 
the party to whom the material was furnished 
or supplied or for whom the labor was done 
or performed. Such notice shall be served 
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by mailing the same by registered mail, 
postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to the contractor at any place he maintains 
an office or conducts his business, or his 
residence, or in any manner in which the 
United States Marshal of the district in 
which the public improvement is situated 
is authorized by law to serve summons. 
Numerous decisions have been decided on the federal 
statute. The Utah State Supreme Court gave application 
to the federal statute in Whiting Brothers Construction 
Company vs. M & S Construction and Engineering Company, 
et. al., 18 U.2d 43, 414 P.2d 961 (1966). The issue 
presented in the Whiting Brothers case was whether a 
materialman or supplier is precluded from recovery 
from a contractor's surety by reason of failure 
to strictly comply with written notice to the prime 
contractor within ninety days. The court found that 
the prime contract had never received written notice 
of the materialmans claims but through oral conversation, 
had actual notice of the claim and held that the ma-
terialman was entitled to recovery against the contractor 
and surety, since the contractor had actual knowledge 
and statute had been complied with. The court said 
at page 44: 
The law to protect laborers and materialmen 
and sub-contractors, and it should be 
literally construed to effect its purpose. 
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The purpose of the ninety days notice was 
to enable the prime contractor to protect 
himself and his surety against a delinquency 
or defaulting sub-contractor. 
Also a similar decision was reached in Houston 
Fire & Casualty Insurance Company vs. United States 
of America for the use and benefit of the Trane 
Company, 217 F.2d 727 (1954). 
In Fleisher Engineering & Construction Company 
et. al. vs. United States for the use and benefit 
of Hallenbeck, 311 U.S. 15 (1940); the materialman 
failed to send notice of claim by registered or certified 
mail and sent the claim by regular mail. The court 
held that regular mail satisfied the requirements 
of the statute, the materialman was not precluded 
from recovery because he had failed to send notice 
by registered or certified mail. The court said at 
page 83: 
In giving the statute a reasonable construction 
in order to effect its remedial purpose, we 
think that a distinction should be drawn between 
the provisions explicity stating the condition 
precedent to the right to sue and the provision 
as to the manner of serving notice. The 
structure of the statute indicates that dis-
tinction. The proviso, which defines the con-
dition precedent to suit, states that the 
materialman or laborer M[slhall have a right 
of action upon the said payment bond upon 
giving written notice to said contractor", 
within ninety days from the date of final 
performance. The condition as thus expressed 
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has fully met. Then the statute goes on 
to provide for the mode of service of the 
notice. "[S]uch notice shall be served by 
mailing the same by registered mail, postage 
prepaid", or "in any manner" in which the 
United States Marshal "is authorized by 
law to serve summons". We think that the 
purpose of this provision as to manner of 
service was to assure receipt of the notice, 
not to make the described method mandatory 
so as to deny right of suit when the required 
written notice within the specified time had 
actually been given and received. In the face 
of such receipt, the reason for a particular 
mode of service fails. It is not reasonable 
to suppose that Congress intended to insist 
upon an idle form. Rather we think that 
Congress intended to provide a method which 
would afford sufficient proof of service 
when receipt of the required written notice 
was not shown". 
The same analysis was given and conclusion 
reached in United States for use of Birmingham Slag 
Company vs. Perry et. al., 115 F.2d (1940). 
Based on the evidence submitted to the tricil 
court, the court found that the general contractor 
Walker had actual notice of the amount due Cox for 
asphalt supplied and that such notice was given within 
ninety days of last delivery. The court's finding 
of the actual notice given is fully supported by 
the facts and evidence adduced at trial. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF $4,4 31.45 FOR ASPHALT DELIVERED 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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All invoices for asphalt supplied by Cox to 
Neeley were admitted into evidence, totalling $4,431.45. 
All of the invoices were signed by Dennis Neeley or 
his employees. At the request of Neeley, each invoice 
had written on it a number assigned by Neeley to 
the Ephraim project, by the Cox scales operator or were 
designated for the Ephraim project. (T.R. p. 47). 
Neeley testified that all of the asphalt as 
evidenced by the invoices submitted went to the Ephraim 
trench project. (T.R. p. 48). And that during the 
month of October, 19 82, Neeley performed no other 
asphalt jobs. (T.R. p. 49). Neeley further testified 
that no asphalt was rejected by Ephraim City or 
any inspector for the project. (T.R. p. 49). 
Walker contended that the first delivery of 
asphalt by Neeley to the Ephraim job, was on October 
19, 1982, and on that same day two loads of asphalt 
were rejected and did no go into the job because 
they had stayed on the truck too long and become too 
cold. However, no invoice existed for the 19th day 
of October, 1982, and when presented with this 
inconsistency, Walker's explanation was that the scales 
person wrote the wrong date down or there was an 
additional invoice that was missing. (T.R. p. 84). 
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Walker further contends that only 110 to 120 
tons of asphalt were needed to complete the job based 
on the trench dimensions. This estimate of needed 
tonage was based on placing the concrete in the trench 
at a depth of three inches. Larry Cox testified 
that he visited the site while asphalt was being 
placed on two different occasions and observed the 
trenches to be between five and six inches deep. 
(T.R. p. 15). 
Neeley also testified that in some places 
the asphalt was placed to a depth of five inches. 
(T.R. p. 50). 
The court's finding and awarding $4,431.45 is 
fully supported by the evidence. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
All of the invoices (See Exhibit No. 1), provided 
a clause for payment of attorney's fees in the event 
of non-payment and court action. All of the invoices 
were executed by either Dennis Neeley or his employees. 
This agreement to pay attorney's fees should carry 
through to the issuer of the bond and the general 
contractor. 
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While there appears to be a period between 
1980 and 1983 when the Public Contract Code, Section i 
14-1-1 et. al., was replaced by the Utah Procurement 
Code, surely it was not the intent of the legislature 
to leave sub-contractors, suppliers and materialmen 
without a remedy against the bond and the general 
contractor. In any event, the lower court certainly 
has the discretion to make an award of attorney's fees. 
Accordingly, the lower court's award of attorney's fees 
was not in err. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants admitted in their answer that a bond 
for payment had been furnished by Balboa. At the time 
of trial, appellants admitted a payment bond had been 
furnished, (T.R. p. 8) the existence of the payment 
bond was admitted and not an issue in the lower court 
and appellants are now barred from challenging the 
existence of the bond. 
Appellants admitted in their answer the appli-
cability of the Utah Procurement Code in the instant 
case. They challenged only that under the Utah 
Procurement Code proper notice had not been given 
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to the general contractor within ninety days after 
the last material was supplied. Notice was properly 
given within ninety days after the last delivery 
of asphalt; appellant Walker had actual notice 
of the obligation and the amount owed. 
Even if the Utah Procurement Code is not 
applicable to the instant case, it was not the intent 
of the legislature to deny a supplier of materials 
recovery on a payment bond. The very purpose of the 
payment bond is to protect suppliers such as respondent. 
The lower court acted within its discretion 
in awarding attorney's fees and did not err. The findings 
of the trial court and award of judgment are fully 
supported by the evidence heard at trial. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 19 85. 
Respectfully Submi-fcted, 
Attorney tor Plaintiff-Respondent 
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